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Abstract 
 M-PESA, the hugely popular mobile money system in Kenya, has been celebrated 
for its potential to “bank the unbanked” and increase access to financial services. This 
paper provides evidence to support this idea and explores mechanisms through which this 
might be the case. It specifically looks at the savings products held by individuals and 
how this changes in relation to M-PESA use. It then constructs an index for measuring 
the extent to which individuals are integrated into the formal financial sector. This paper 
argues that M-PESA’s effect on financial inclusion is a growing phenomenon, which 
suggests that keeping pace with the rapid evolutions of this mobile money system should 
be a high priority for researchers. As this paper elucidates, M-PESA has become notably 
more integrated with the formal financial sector in 2013 as compared to 2009, which 
holds implications for user behavior.  
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1. Introduction  
 Exclusion from financial services ranks among the most challenging obstacles 
facing the poor. The rise of mobile money, defined as the provision of financial services 
through mobile phones, has been heralded as a way to give the poor greater access to 
formal financial services. The high prevalence of mobile phones in Sub-Saharan has been 
a well-documented phenomenon, so the introduction of technology that transforms these 
phones into financial intermediaries could potentially have dramatic implications for 
development.  Although mobile money technology is relatively new, it has seen 
remarkably rapid expansion. According to a 2012 Global Mobile Money Adoption 
Survey, 150 mobile money systems in 72 countries have been deployed, and another 109 
projects are in planning phases (Penicaud 2013). 
 This paper focuses specifically on Kenya, a country that is often considered to be 
home to the world’s most developed mobile money system. This system is called “M-
PESA,” a combination of “mobile” and “pesa,” the Swahili word for money. M-PESA 
was launched in March 2007 by Safaricom, a telecommunications company that heavily 
dominates the cell phone market in Kenya.  Its initial function was to serve as a simple 
mechanism for person-to-person transfers. Users go to M-PESA agent outlets, where they 
can exchange cash for “e-money” that can then be sent through their phone to the phone 
of another user. Users can also go to agents to convert their electronic money into cash. 
Uptake of M-PESA has been rapid and extensive, having been adopted by nearly 70% of 
the adult population within four years of launch (Jack and Suri 2014). 
Another notable characteristic of the Kenyan context is the size and reach of the 
mobile money system relative to the rest of the financial sector. Significantly more 
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people have mobile money accounts than bank accounts, in large part due to the low-start 
up costs and high availability of agent locations. As of 2011, there were 28,000 M-PESA 
agent outlets in Kenya but only 850 bank branches (Jack and Suri 2014). Company 
reports show that 12,000 new agents were added in 2012, bringing the total up to nearly 
40,000 agents.1  
Safaricom regards M-PESA as a critical revenue source and has implemented a 
number of innovative changes to the system since its inception. What began as a system 
for simply texting money from person to person has now grown to provide a suite of 
financial offerings, ranging from Lipa Karo (for school fee payments) to PesaPoint (an 
ATM for accessing the M-PESA account).  As M-PESA’s website proudly proclaims, 
Safaricom believes that their mobile money system has increased financial inclusion and 
“ushered [in] a new era of financial empowerment…that drastically changed and 
continues to change the lives of Kenyans.”  
Given the rapidly expanding nature of M-PESA services as well as its users, this 
paper hypothesizes that significant differences in the nature of the M-PESA system can 
be observed over time. It shows that M-PESA has indeed become more integrated into 
the formal sector over time and increasingly promotes the formal sector presence of its 
users. This paper updates existing insights into the M-PESA system with a dataset from 
2013, which is more recent than any datasets in the existing scholarly literature. Even 
recently published articles use data that might be outdated in key ways. For example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1http://www.safaricom.co.ke/safaricom_annual_report/pdfs/Safaricom_Annual_Report.pdf 
 
 
 
 
2 1 Kenyan Shilling=0.012 USD 
3 According to World Bank data, Kenya’s annual per capita GNI (in current US$) was $780 in 2009 and 
$860 in 2012, which represents a 10% increase. The Expense variable in this paper also increases by 10% 
from 2009 to 2013. The Expense variable’s average corresponds to an annual figure of approximately 1127 
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Jack and Suri (2014) use data collected between 2008 and 2010.  This paper argues that 
an increased focus should be paid to questioning and updating our understanding of M-
PESA. It especially encourages research in the area of how M-PESA interacts with other 
financial products, given the tremendous benefits that could be reaped from a mobile 
money system that allows excluded individuals to interact with the formal financial sector 
for the first time.  
2.  Literature Review 
 A number of studies have examined mobile money’s capacity for increasing the 
welfare of users. These have found that M-PESA decreases the transaction costs of 
transferring money. Kenya has high rates of rural-urban migration and thus many long-
distance remittances, which were transported through risky, inconvenient, and expensive 
methods such as bus-driver couriers or money transfers through Western Union (Mbiti 
and Weil 2011). One micro-study found that rural users saw an increase in income after 
using M-PESA, driven by the increased ease of receiving remittances (Morawczynski and 
Pickens 2009). There is convincing evidence that M-PESA allows users to send and 
receive more remittances with wider risk-sharing networks, which enhances their ability 
to hedge risk and smooth consumption. When faced with unexpected adverse events, M-
PESA users do not experience a change in consumption, while non-users see a decrease 
(Jack and Suri 2014). Looking specifically at negative health shocks, Suri, Jack and 
Stoker (2012) find that M-PESA users can pay for healthcare costs without cutting back 
on other expenditures such as food.  Customers also benefit from M-PESA when it 
exposes existing financial service providers to greater competition. This can result in 
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higher quality services and downward pressure on prices, as was seen with Western 
Union (Mbiti and Weil 2011).  
The nature of the relationship between M-PESA and other financial products 
remains a matter of debate. One theory posits that M-PESA substitutes with informal 
savings products and complements with formal ones. Jack and Suri (2011) find that over 
75% of users use M-PESA for saving and cite ease of use and safety as reasons for doing 
so.  Qualitative analysis reports that users have moved money away from informal 
savings, especially saving at home, into M-PESA (Morawcyznski and Pickens 2009). On 
the other hand, M-PESA’s innovations may increase access to formal savings by 
reducing the limitations of geographic distance, which Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 
(2012) identify as one of the most commonly-cited barriers to having a formal savings 
account. In 2010, Safaricom introduced M-KESHO, an interest-garnering savings 
account with Equity Bank that has no opening fees and can be entirely accessed through 
M-PESA . Following this launch, other banks also began making partnerships with M-
PESA, allowing their financial services to “ride on the rails” of the M-PESA network. 
Users can now use M-PESA to deposit money into accounts with 36 different banks, 28 
of which also allow withdrawals from the account to be made over M-PESA (Financial 
Access Initiative 2010). In 2012, Safaricom partnered with the Commercial Bank of 
Kenya to launch M-Shwari, an M-PESA-based savings and loan product that has seen 
fairly high rates of uptake (Kaffenberger 2014).  
Although much of the excitement surrounding M-PESA concerns its ability to 
connect the financially excluded, the literature finds that better-off individuals actually 
use the product more. On average, M-PESA users are more likely to be wealthier, better 
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educated, urban, and already banked (Aker and Mbiti 2010). People with bank accounts 
use it nearly three times as much as those without bank accounts (Mbiti and Weil 2011). 
This user disparity declines over time as a larger and more diverse portion of the 
population starts using M-PESA. Jack and Suri (2011) conduct two rounds of surveys (in 
2008 and 2009) and confirm that earlier adopters of M-PESA are more privileged in a 
number of ways than later adopters.  
This selection bias amongst M-PESA users implies the presence of endogeneity 
concerns that make it more difficult to establish causality. Simply looking at the 
relationship between an individual’s savings formality level and their M-PESA usage 
would lead to bias, because it might be that financial-savviness makes individuals both 
more likely to adopt M-PESA and more likely to have formal savings. Demombynes and 
Thegeya (2012) use community M-PESA adoption rate as an instrument for individual 
M-PESA use, reasoning that community take-up should affect individual M-PESA take-
up but not individual financial savviness. They conclude adoption and find that M-PESA 
increases an individual’s likelihood of having savings. Similarly, Mbiti and Weil (2011) 
construct an instrument based on several measures of a community’s dissatisfaction with 
alternative money transfer methods (for example, the proportion of people who felt the 
post office was the slowest way to transfer money). They reason that viewing alternative 
transfer methods unfavorably predicts M-PESA take-up but not savings. This study finds 
that M-PESA makes people less likely to use informal savings but more likely to be 
banked. However, the instruments in both papers fail to account for the possibility of a 
common community effect that influences both M-PESA take-up and savings behavior, 
so endogeneity remains a concern. Consequently, this paper focuses on changes within 
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the same individual to remove the environmental effects that might otherwise bias the 
analysis. 
The literature has also provided support for the opposing theory that M-PESA 
may make formal savings less attractive. Decreasing the transaction costs of savings 
accounts do not necessarily make them more attractive. One study in Kenya found that 
ATM cards actually decreased account use for people with low levels of intra-household 
bargaining power (Schaner 2013). These savers, who are often women, are pressured to 
use their funds to support other family members and have a harder time refusing when 
their money is more liquid. In addition, there is evidence that people might choose to 
forego bank usage for reasons other than inaccessibility—namely, feelings of distrust or 
disillusionment towards banks (Dupas et al. 2012).  Moreover, an analysis of M-banking 
in South Africa found that the system did not meaningfully expand the access frontier of 
financial products, although the author suggests that remains a possible development in 
the future (Porteous 2007). 
 This paper extends the literature by exploring the relationship between M-PESA 
and savings using recently released data. It focuses specifically on financial inclusion, 
something that has been regarded by policy makers as a central priority. When people 
have access to a diverse array of financial services, they are better equipped to handle 
adverse situations and increase welfare outcomes. Burgess and Pande 
 (2005) show that bank branch expansion significantly alleviated poverty in rural India. 
Formal institutions generally have access to larger capital sources, provide greater 
reliability, and have been shown to hold large potential benefits for the poor (Brune et al. 
2011; Allen et al. 2013). However, it has also been well-noted that the formal financial 
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sector often excludes the poor, who often do not meet the requirements for acquiring 
certain financial products. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
This paper explores the substitutive effect of M-PESA by testing the popular 
theory that M-PESA users shift funds away from informal savings and into M-PESA, 
which they consider to be a superior savings device. It also investigates whether M-PESA 
also causes shifts in funds away from formal savings. In the next sections, it looks at 
changes in an individual’s formality level to see, on balance, whether these shifts make 
users more included in the formal financial sector. “Formality level” refers to the types of 
savings products used by an individual. Between 2009 and 2013, the M-PESA system 
expanded both its user base and service offerings. One main structural change was the 
integration of banks into the M-PESA network. This should theoretically increase the use 
of formal bank products, both by enabling people to access new formal products like M-
KESHO, and by lowering the transaction costs associated with formal bank accounts in 
general. However, this has not yet been tested empirically. However, this paper looks at 
differences between findings in the 2009 and 2013 datasets to provide such evidence.  
This paper looks at change within individuals by comparing each respondent’s 
financial situation in the past to that same individual’s current financial situation. This 
allows for observations of change over time that keep constant the various personal and 
community-based variables that might influence usage of both M-PESA and formal 
financial products. Past studies have used community-level instruments, but these do not 
completely address this endogeneity concern. Several factors, such as a community’s 
feelings of trust in financial innovations, could theoretically increase both M-PESA use 
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and bank use. So, focusing on change within individuals allows for greater isolation of 
the M-PESA effect. 
To measure this change, this paper constructs an index of financial inclusion. The 
aim of doing so is simply to enable empirical comparisons of change over time. Financial 
inclusion is broadly defined as a person’s ability to access financial services, but the 
nuances of this definition vary from source to source. Usage of formal accounts is a 
central indicator of financial inclusion that is employed, even across different 
measurements. The World Bank’s Global Findex database considers “formal accounts” to 
include microfinance institutions (MFIs) and cooperatives, as well as banks and credit 
unions (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper 2012). Others such as the CRISIL financial 
inclusion index look specifically at bank branches, noting that Non-Banking Finance 
Companies (NBFCs) and MFIs can be added if reliable data later deems this appropriate 
(“CRISIL”). Financial Sector Deepening-Kenya identifies four levels of formality: 
excluded, informal, formal other, and formal (“Appendix” 2009). For the purposes of this 
paper, the “formal” sector includes only banking institutions, as this allows for a group 
that is clearly and cohesively and defined.  
 As articulated in a working paper from the International Monetary Fund, “a 
formal consensus on how [financial inclusion] should be measured has yet to be reached” 
(Amidzic et al. 2014). This paper does not aim to take a stance on this issue and instead 
employs two methods of calculating an individual’s financial inclusion level to establish 
a range of possibilities. The first looks at the most formal product a person is using. This 
view considers a person to be fully financially included as long as he has one formal 
savings product, regardless of what other savings product he uses. This interpretation 
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assumes that the most defining characteristic of one’s financial inclusiveness is whether 
or not he uses any kind of formal savings. The next view looks at how formal the basket 
of products used by an individual is, on average. This view considers someone who uses 
only formal products to be more included than someone who uses formal and informal 
products, since the latter scenario implies that an individual cannot have all her financial 
needs met through formal means. This interpretation sees financial inclusiveness as a 
measure of how fully an individual’s financial behaviors are integrated into the formal 
sector. There is no established precedent for which assumption is more valid, and both 
interpretations answer interesting questions in the M-PESA context, so the paper 
proceeds using both. 
Finally, this paper acknowledges that increased accessibility of the formal 
financial sector does actually decrease its attractiveness in certain situations. This studies 
the people on the sending end of support transfers. Since individuals feel more social 
pressure to support friends and family when they can tap into their savings and 
disseminate it with ease, M-PESA may make some bank accounts less attractive than, for 
example, a ROSCA where money is held by other individuals. Studying whether or not 
M-PESA has this perverse effect can serve as another test of how integrated M-PESA is 
into the formal system. 
4. Data 
This paper uses data from the FinAccess Surveys, which were conducted with 
support of Financial Sector Deepening Kenya, The Financial Access Partnership, and the 
Central Bank of Kenya. These are nationally-representative household surveys conducted 
in 2006, 2009, and 2013; this paper draws upon the two most recent waves. A major 
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limitation of the data is that it does not follow the same panel of individuals across the 
years.  However, this dataset is still highly regarded for its representative sampling and is 
commonly used in the literature. 
Table 1 shows that the populations in 2009 and 2013 have similar baseline 
characteristics. In this paper, “M-PESA User” is the central explanatory variable, and the 
other variables listed in Table 1 are included as controls in all analyses. The portion of 
the sample that is classified as an M-PESA user below might seem surprisingly low given 
statistics about mobile money takeup. That is because the “M-PESA User” variable 
reflects whether someone reports being a “registered user,” but people can use mobile 
money without being registered. When phrased as “have you ever used” M-PESA/mobile 
money, the number of users increases to 38.62% and 77.75% of the 2009 and 2013 
samples, respectively. This paper uses the registered users number because it is easier to 
answer accurately and because these people are more likely to use M-PESA on a regular 
basis, so this measure lends itself to more valuable insights about the impact of M-PESA. 
The phrasing on this question is slightly different between the two years: the 2009 survey 
asks about M-PESA while the 2013 survey asks about “mobile money,” which includes 
competitor systems offered by companies such as Airtel, Orange, and YuMobile. 
However, this paper uses “M-PESA” to refer to this entire category because Safaricom’s 
mobile money market share is very large (around 80%), the other systems do not 
dramatically differ from M-PESA, and terminology is kept consistent with 2009 (Kuria 
2014).   
 The “Monthly Expenses” variable is a proxy for wealth and is expressed in 
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Kenyan Shillings.2 Since the 2009 survey did not ask directly about income, this paper 
constructs a measure using total monthly spending on a set of items that were asked about 
in both years. This variable increases from 2009 to 2013 at a rate alongside per capita 
GNI, which adds validity to this measure as a proxy.3 “Educational level” refers to the 
highest level of education attained by the respondent on a scale of 1 (none) to 7 
(university degree). The mean level, 3, corresponds to completion of primary school. 
Table 1. Summary of Respondent Characteristics 
 
 
2009 2013  
 N=6597 N=5844  
Variables % of Sample % of Sample  
M-PESA User 27.65% 59.36%  
Gender 
  
 
     Male 41.31% 40.83%  
     Female 58.69% 59.17%  
Household head gender 
  
 
     Male 76.25% 69.03%  
     Female 23.75% 30.97%  
Cluster type 
  
 
     Rural 71.32% 64.37%  
     Urban 28.68% 35.63%  
Marital status 
  
 
     Single 23.47% 22.42%  
     Married/Live with Partner 60.19% 64.68%  
     Other 16.34% 12.90%  
Is Household Head 48.70% 49.64%  
Owns A Mobile Phone 46.67% 66.96%  
   
 
 
2009 Mean 2013 Mean  
Age 38.71 36.33  
Household Head age 45.48 41.88  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 1 Kenyan Shilling=0.012 USD 
3 According to World Bank data, Kenya’s annual per capita GNI (in current US$) was $780 in 2009 and 
$860 in 2012, which represents a 10% increase. The Expense variable in this paper also increases by 10% 
from 2009 to 2013. The Expense variable’s average corresponds to an annual figure of approximately 1127 
USD and 1241 USD in 2009 and 2013 respectively. Although these numbers are slightly larger than the 
GNI figures, this may be attributable to the fact that all survey respondents are adults or due to a difference 
in applying exchange rates. 
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Monthly Expenses 7825.20 8618.41  
Educational Level 3.10 3.18  
 
 
 
After dropping individuals with missing answers to questions regarding key 
personal characteristics, this paper uses a sample of 6597 individuals in 2009 and 5844 
individuals in 2013. The analyses in this paper were then restricted to people who said 
they had some role in household financial decisions, since these people are most likely to 
have accurate survey answers about household use of financial products. In addition, 
since the analyses are performed at an individual level, it only makes sense to draw 
conclusions about how someone’s use of M-PESA impacts his use of other products if he 
plays a role in determining what other products he uses.  82% of the sample in 2009 and 
90% of the sample in 2013 were considered decision makers. 
A central question in these surveys that is exploited in this paper is one that asks 
respondents about their usage of various financial products. The list spans a huge variety 
of products, and this paper focuses only on products that are asked about in both the 2009 
and 2013 surveys, so as to allow for comparisons.  This paper looks at the following 
savings products and classifies them using formality levels seen below. Level 2 products 
are offered by a formal banking institution. Level 1 products span a variety of informal 
products, which are provided by organizations, colleagues, friends, family, or the user 
himself. Although there is notable variation in formality between products within Level 
1, this paper considers them all to be in the same category to focus on the more clear 
distinction that exists between informal products and bank-offered products. Individuals 
without any of these savings products comprise Level 0. Figure 1 summarizes the 
products studied in this paper, using the same wordings and explanations as the 
	   16	  
FinAccess surveys. 
 
 
Figure 1. Savings Products by Formality Level 
Formal (Level 2) 
• Postbank account 
• Bank account for savings or investment (which pays interest) 
• Current account-with a checkbook 
• Bank account for everyday needs but no checkbook 
Informal (Level 1) 
• Savings account at Saving and Credit Cooperatives (SACCO) 
[organization which requires you to be member, e.g. agricultural or workplace co-op] 
• Savings at microfinance institutions  
[organization which mostly lends to members in a group] 
• Savings with an Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCA) 
 [a group that lends to other people with interest] 
• Savings with a Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA)/Merry-go-round  
[a group that collects money from each member and gives it to one person in turn] 
• Savings with a group of friends 
• Savings given to a family or friend to keep 
• Savings you keep in a secret hiding place 
 
For each of these products, the FinAccess surveys ask individuals to identify as 
one of the following mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive categories: 1.) 
currently has the product 2.) used to have the product but no longer has the product 3.) 
never had the product. Category 2 is interesting because it demonstrates change within an 
individual, although this change is only observed in one direction. The survey does not 
ask about how long someone when they started using the products they use, so it is 
challenging to directly measure positive change and consequently difficult to know the 
direction of net change. However, given the rarity of panel data on this topic, this 
measure of change still provides interesting insights. Also, if we assume that people do 
not change products on a very frequent basis, any evidence of some kind of change is 
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interesting. Another limitation of the data is that it does not record magnitudes—we know 
whether or not someone is using a product, but not how much he puts in it or how often 
he uses it. 
5. Empirical Specification & Results 
5A. Dropping Informal and Formal Savings 
 
What products do people shift away from when they have M-PESA? The following 
regressions address this question: 
 1                     𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟!" + 𝛽!𝑋!" + 𝜀!" 
 2                     𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠!" = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟!" + 𝛽!𝑋!" + 𝜀!" 
 
where DropInformalSavingsit is a variable, for individual i from Year t , that equals 1 if 
that person answers “used to have, but no longer have” to one or more of the products 
listed in the Informal category from Figure 1, and equals 0 otherwise. MPESAUserit is a 
variable, for individual i from Year t , that equals 1 if that person currently is an M-PESA 
user and equals 0 otherwise. X represents a set of controls, as listed in Table 1 and Table 
2. 
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Table 2. OLS Results for Dropping of Savings 
 
DropInformalSave 
in 2009 
DropFormalSave 
in 2009 
DropInformalSave 
in 2013 
DropFormalSave 
in 2013 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     MPESAUser 0.0423** 0.0710*** 0.0792*** 0.0299** 
 
(2.64) (5.75) (4.23) (2.59) 
     Gender 0.0325 -0.0366* 0.0260 -0.0263* 
 
(1.47) (-2.15) (1.31) (-2.14) 
     Age 0.00289*** 0.00342*** 0.00225** 0.00172** 
 
(3.70) (5.67) (2.59) (3.23) 
     Hhold head age -0.00104 0.000449 -0.000791 -0.000204 
 
(-1.20) (0.67) (-0.97) (-0.40) 
     Hhold head gender 0.00647 -0.00744 0.0192 0.00190 
 
(0.27) (-0.40) (0.97) (0.16) 
     Education 0.0214*** 0.0220*** 0.0140** 0.0143*** 
 
(4.86) (6.47) (2.79) (4.61) 
     Cluster 0.0290* 0.0120 0.0159 0.0266** 
 
(2.01) (1.08) (1.10) (3.00) 
     Marital 0.0149* 0.00798 0.00159 0.0101* 
 
(2.29) (1.59) (0.25) (2.57) 
     Expense -0.000000446 0.000000347 0.000000346 0.000000755*** 
 
(-1.90) (1.92) (0.95) (3.38) 
     Is hhold head 0.0216 0.0168 -0.00939 0.0172 
 
(0.89) (0.89) (-0.50) (1.47) 
OwnMobile 0.00951 0.0438*** 0.0152 0.0265* 
 
(0.64) (3.85) (0.78) (2.19) 
Constant -.0941   -0.136*** 0.0817 -0.0896** 
 
(-1.77) (-3.30) (1.59) (-2.84) 
Number of obs. 5415 5415 5251 5251 
R-squared 0.0210 0.0830 0.0186 0.0422 
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t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 5 percent level, ** Significant at the 1 percent level,  
*** Significant at the 0.1 percent level 
 
Columns 1 and 3 show the results of equation (1) for years 2009 and 2013 respectively. 
Columns 2 and 4 show the results of equation (2) and together demonstrate that M-PESA 
has a statistically significant substitutive relationship to dropping savings, for both formal 
and informal products in both years.   
In 2009, being an M-PESA user is associated with a 4.2% increase in the 
likelihood of dropping informal savings and a 7.1% increase in the probability of 
dropping formal savings.  This runs counter to the conventional belief that M-PESA 
moves people from informal to formal methods. M-PESA substitutes, in a certain sense, 
with formal savings to a greater extent than it does with informal savings. However, this 
does not prove that people are substituting from formal savings to informal savings, since 
entirely different individuals could be driving the significance of the two coefficients. 
One explanation may be that those who drop formal savings are the financially elite who 
have multiple accounts and have high product mobility. So, M-PESA may make them 
drop some of their bank accounts, but they still have other ones and might even pick up 
new ones—the net effect is unknown. Another explanation is that M-PESA users are 
more likely than non-users (especially in 2009, where there is greater user selection bias) 
to have formal accounts in the first place. When the dependent variable equals “0”, it 
does not distinguish between those who had formal accounts that they still presently hold 
and those who never had formal accounts. Perhaps many 2013 M-PESA users fall into 
the latter category and thus do not have a “1” for the dependent variable, but not because 
they feel less disillusionment with formal accounts than 2009 users do. 
	   20	  
In 2013, this regression suggests a reversed finding—being an M-PESA user is 
associated with a larger increase in the probability of dropping an informal savings 
product than a formal savings product (7.9% and 3.0%, respectively). This might be 
because people with informal savings are more likely to be looking for alternative places 
to save their money, and M-PESA offers superior security and reliability. In addition, 
there is less selection bias in 2013, because this year also contains the effect of some late 
adopters of M-PESA. These people render the average M-PESA user in 2013 to be less 
financially elite than the average M-PESA user in 2009.   Users in 2013 may thus be less 
likely to drop formal savings because they did not have these accounts in the first place. 
Comparing between years, there is an increase from 2009 to 2013 in the 
magnitude of 𝛽!, the relationship between M-PESA and dropping informal savings. 
However, the coefficients are not statistically different.4 However, formal savings see a 
decrease in magnitude of 𝛽! from 2009 to 2013. These two coefficients are found to be 
statistically different at a 5% significance level.5 This regression cannot say whether this 
difference is due to changes in the user base, structural changes in M-PESA services, or 
changes in how the same people use M-PESA after having it for longer. Still, it possibly 
provides further evidence that there is a meaningful difference between 2009 and 2013 
users, where the latter category consists of less financially savvy users who are also less 
likely to have had formal savings in the past. 
While M-PESA is often thought of as a substitute for informal savings, this result 
presents evidence that it might also substitute for formal savings. This could happen if, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 A test of the null hypothesis, 𝛽!,!""# − 𝛽!,!"#$ = 0 has a p-value of .1373, so the null hypothesis that the 
two coefficients are statistically the same cannot be rejected. 
5 A test of the null hypothesis 𝛽!,!""# − 𝛽!,!"#$ = 0 has a p-value of .0197, so the null hypothesis can be 
rejected. 
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for example, someone feels that his bank is too difficult to access or untrustworthy, so he 
would rather save with M-PESA. However, this question needs further research, as this 
regression cannot rule out the possibility that there is a counteracting complementary 
relationship that is even stronger and results in M-PESA on balance increasing formal 
savings. In addition, these results do not say anything about causality. It is not known 
when these changes happened, so it is possible that some changes happened prior to M-
PESA, in which case the changes certainly cannot be attributed to M-PESA. It is also 
possible some unconsidered effect is driving both M-PESA adoption and savings 
dropping behavior. Still, it may be reasonable to assume that reported drops are the ones 
people remember and are thus fairly recent and roughly take place around the time of M-
PESA introduction. 
5B. Constructing a Savings Formality Index  
 
This next section considers how a person’s previously held basket of financial 
products compares to what they currently have. In the previous section, there was no 
differentiation between those who drop some kind of formal savings but still have other 
kinds of formal savings, compared to those who drop formal savings and now don’t have 
any formal savings. So, this section constructs an index that measures current and former 
savings levels to identify changes in a person’s financial inclusiveness. The dependent 
variable is constructed as follows. A more positive value represents movement towards 
greater savings formality, while a negative value means someone is trending towards a 
lower savings formality level. ∆𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒!"##$%& − 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒!"#$ 
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This paper does not take a singular stance on how this index should be constructed and 
instead employs two methods that are each justified on different grounds. It looks at each 
respondent’s highest level and his or her average level of savings formality. This paper 
also considers two different but equally plausible assumptions about what products an 
individual used in the past. The FinAccess surveys do not provide direct information on 
respondents’ past product use, but this logically must be some combination of the 
products they 1.) currently have 2.) used to have but no longer have (“dropped”) . This 
paper considers both extremes: a.) when all of someone’s currently held products were 
also held in the past and b.) when none of someone’s currently held products were also 
held in the past. The true percentage of current products that were held pre-MPESA must 
fall somewhere between these two assumptions. Because this paper is not equipped to 
definitively choose between the different approaches described here, it explores all of 
them to establish a range of plausible scenarios. After applying combinations of both 
methods and both assumptions to the data, patterns that hold true across all four scoring 
systems are accepted as highly robust.  
This paper employs the following three regressions to investigate changes in 
savings level: the first looks at scores for the dataset overall (with Year as a dummy 
variable that equals 0 for 2009 data and equals 1 for 2013 data), and the next two look at 
each of the datasets separately to see how the landscapes differ between the two years. 
Again, M-PESA user status is the explanatory variable and X represents a set of controls. 3         ∆𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒! = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟! + 𝛽!𝑋! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟!+𝜀! 
 4         ∆𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒!,!""# = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟!,!""# + 𝛽!𝑋!,!""#+𝜀!,!""# 
 5         ∆𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒!,!"#$ = 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟!,!"#$ + 𝛽!𝑋!,!"#$+𝜀!,!"#$ 
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A limitation to this approach is the ambiguity relating to just how long a period of 
time the “past” covers. Note that the “past” does not correspond to any specific year, 
although “present” is known to correspond to 2009 or 2013 depending on what dataset 
the respondent belongs to. This analysis is most meaningful if “past” and “present” 
matched to pre- and post- M-PESA adoption periods (for those who do adopt it). 
However, it is unknown when products were dropped, and it is possible some of these 
changes occurred before M-PESA even existed. Then, it would be inappropriate to 
attribute these changes to M-PESA. Fortunately, it is fairly uncommon for people to 
report dropping a savings product. A variable measuring the total number of products 
dropped (which theoretically ranges from 0 to 11, the number of savings products 
analyzed in this paper) has the following summary statistics: a mean of 0.49 total drops, a 
standard deviation of 0.88 drops, a min of 0, and a max of 8. Since M-PESA is, for many 
Kenyans, the largest exogenous shock to their financial behavior in recent memory, 
mobile money likely relates to many of the drops that people remember to report on the 
survey. Further, this paper employs a variety of regressions, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of observing spurious relationships between M-PESA and dropping behavior. 
Still, it is important to note that these findings do not imply causality, which is an area 
that should be explored in future research. 
Method 1: Maximum Savings Formality 
 
The first scoring method looks at the highest level of formality associated with an 
individual’s savings products. The index is created according the labels in Figure 2. The 
past score is estimated in two ways: the “lower estimate” assumes that a person’s 
currently used products are all new—none of them were in the past. The “higher 
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estimate” assumes that a person’s currently used products were all also used in the past. 
For example, if a person has “2” in either SavingsScorecurrent or SavingsScorePast (lower 
estimate), that person would have also have a 2 in SavingsScorePast (higher Estimate). 
Figure 2. Method 1 SavingsScore Label Explanations 
SavingsScorecurrent SavingsScorePast (lower 
estimate) 
SavingsScorePast (higher 
estimate) 
2 Has formal 
savings 
2 Has dropped formal 
savings 
2 Had or currently 
has formal savings 
1 Does not have 
formal, does 
have informal 
savings 
1 Has not dropped 
formal savings, but 
has dropped informal 
savings 
1 Has never held 
formal savings. Had 
or currently has 
informal savings 
0 Does not have 
any savings 
0 Has not dropped any 
savings 
0 Has never held 
formal or informal 
savings 
 
Under the lower-estimated-past assumption (the middle column in Figure 2), no 
current products were used in the past. ∆SavingsScore ranges from -2 (someone has no 
current savings and used to have formal savings, so he has seen a decline in formality) to 
2 (someone has formal savings and has not dropped any savings, so he presumably had 
no savings before). 
Under the higher-estimated-past assumption (the right-most column in Figure 
2), all current products were also used in the past. SavingsScorePast ≥   SavingsScorecurrent, 
thus ∆SavingsScore ranges from -2 to 0 (someone has not dropped any savings that are 
more formal than what they currently own, so her past formality presumably equals 
current formality). 
 The results of regressions 3-5 using the lower-estimated-past assumption are seen 
in Table 3. Being an M-PESA user is associated with a SavingScore change that is on 
average 0.135 points more positive. Although causality cannot be inferred, this shows 
that M-PESA user status induces movement towards increased formality. Columns 2 and 
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3 show results of equations 4 and 5, respectively. A test of whether 𝛽!from the 2009 
analysis and 𝛽!and the 2013 analysis are statistically different reveals that they are 
different at a 10% significance level.	  The	  p-­‐value	  for	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  these	  coefficients	  are	  the	  same	  is	  equal	  to	  0.084. Thus, being an M-PESA user results in a 
greater formality boost in 2013 as compared to 2009. This is heartening evidence that M-
PESA’s capacity to promote financial inclusion seems to increase over time. This might 
be attributable to the M-KESHO and m-Shwari accounts that were introduced between 
these two years. It is also possible that the integration of 36 banks into the M-PESA 
networks generally made bank accounts more attractive. Or, this SavingsScore boost 
might driven by users moving from savings level 0 to savings level 1. This could happen 
if M-PESA makes it easier for people to transact with informal savings partners, for 
example by making ROSCA savings groups more attractive by making it easier to 
transfer money to others.  
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Table 3.  Method 1 OLS Results Using the Lower-Estimated-past Assumption  
Dependent Variable=∆SavingsScore 
 Overall 2009 2013 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    MPESAUser 0.135*** 0.0855* 0.176*** 
 
(5.47) (2.49) (4.80) 
    Year -0.300*** 
  
 
(-15.94) 
      
Gender 0.0789** 0.0994* 0.0646 
 (2.72) (2.10) (1.66) 
    
Age -0.00442*** -0.00640*** -0.00261 
 (-3.83) (-3.82) (-1.54) 
    
Hhold head age 0.00113 0.00143 0.000638 
 (0.96) (0.78) (0.40) 
    
Hhold head 
gender -0.0427 -0.0422 -0.0458 
 (-1.41) (-0.81) (-1.17) 
Education 0.0710*** 0.0586*** 0.0820*** 
 (10.45) (6.22) (8.33) 
Cluster -0.00501 -0.0107 0.00308 
 (-0.24) (-0.35) (0.11) 
Marital 0.00136 0.00545 -0.000923 
 (0.15) (0.39) (-0.07) 
Expense 0.00000205*** 0.00000150** 0.00000328*** 
 (4.99) (2.99) (4.61) 
Is Hhold Head 0.0658* 0.0951 0.0473 
 (2.22) (1.82) (1.27) 
OwnMobile 0.106*** 0.123*** 0.0891* 
 (4.36) (3.91) (2.32) 
Constant 0.409*** 0.469*** 0.0358 
 
(5.44) (4.11) (0.36) 
Number of obs. 10666 5415 5251 
R-squared 0.0734 0.0568 0.0675 
    t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 5 percent level, ** Significant at the 1 
percent level, *** Significant at the 0.1 percent level.  
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Next, Table 4 reports results of the higher-estimated-past assumption. These 
results fail to show that M-PESA has a statistically significant effect in any of the 
equations 3-5. This is not surprising, since the lower-estimated-past assumption is 
expected to overestimate the number of people that exhibit no change from the past to the 
present. In fact, 87.68% of the sample had a “0” for ∆SavingsScore. These individuals 
belong to the two groups: 1.) those who do not report dropping any products and 2.) those 
who report dropping savings product(s) that are of equal or lesser formality to currently 
held product(s). I then perform equations 3-5 on just this second group, to consider just 
the people who report some sort of dropping behavior. In other words, they “used to have 
but no longer have” one or more of the 11 savings products. Columns 4-6 show a 
statistically significant and positive effect. Conditional on someone being a person who 
has dropped a savings product, being an M-PESA user leads to a larger movement 
towards formality, meaning that it is associated with increased financial inclusion. Being 
an M-PESA User is associated with a formality score change that is 0.075 points and .105 
points higher on average, in 2009 and 2013 respectively. The results from Table 4 do not 
contradict the story from Table 3 that being an M-PESA user boosts formality, and that 
this boost is greater in 2013 than in 2009. However, caution must be applied in 
interpreting how much the findings from Table 4 provide support, since the coefficient of 
interest in columns 1-3 are statistically insignificant.  
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Table 4.  Method 1 OLS Results under the Higher-Estimated-Past Assumption 
Dependent Variable  = ∆SavingsScore 
 Overall 2009 2013 
Overall, 
 if dropped 
in past 
2009,  
if dropped 
in past 
2013, if 
dropped 
in past 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       MPESAUser -0.00451 -0.00405 -0.00796 0.0962*** 0.0750* 0.105* 
 
(-0.41) (-0.29) (-0.44) (3.38) (1.98) (2.48) 
       Year -0.0568*** 
  
-0.0971*** 
  
 
(-6.71) 
  
(-4.43) 
  Age -0.00377*** -0.00447*** -0.00292*** -0.00466*** -0.00541** -0.00373 
       
Other 
Controls varies varies varies varies varies varies 
       Constant -0.101* -0.0829 -0.167** -0.725*** -0.733*** -0.788*** 
 
(-2.53) (-1.57) (-2.76) (-6.83) (-4.58) (-5.48) 
       N 10666 5415 5251 3543 1574 1969 
R-squared 0.0192 0.0296 0.0073 0.0461 0.0646 0.0374 
       t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 5 percent level, ** Significant at the 1 percent level, 
*** Significant at the 0.1 percent level. Other than age, no other controls were consistently 
significant across the regressions 
 
Method 2: Average Savings Formality 
 
 This second approach to constructing a savings formality score looks at the 
“average” formality level for a person’s basket of savings products. This differs from 
Method 1 because here, someone who has a formal savings product is given a different 
score depending on whether or not they also have informal savings.  Again, the “lower 
estimate” assumes that the products a person held in the “past” exactly equals the 
products she reports dropping. The “higher estimate” assumes that a person previously 
held both the “dropped” products and the “currently held” products.  
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Figure 3. Method 2 Savings Score Label Explanations 
SavingsScorecurrent SavingsScorePast (lower 
estimate) 
SavingsScorePast (higher 
estimate) 
2 Has formal 
savings only 
2 Has dropped formal 
savings only 
2 Had or currently 
has formal savings 
but has never had 
informal savings 
1.5 Has formal and 
informal 
savings 
1.5 Has dropped formal 
and informal savings 
1.5 Has had experience 
with formal and 
informal savings 
1 Has only 
incurformal 
savings 
1 Has dropped informal 
savings only 
1 Has never held 
formal savings. Had 
or currently has 
informal savings 
0 Does not have 
any savings 
0 Has not dropped any 
savings 
0 Has never held 
formal or informal 
savings 
 
 As explained previously in the Method 1 section, the lower-estimated-past 
assumption creates a greater range of possible ∆SavingsScore values, here ranging from 
-2 to 2. Under the higher-estimated-past assumption, ∆SavingsScore can range from -2 
(currently has no savings but previously had formal savings) to 0.5 (currently uses only 
formal savings but previously had both formal and informal savings).   
The results of regressions 3-5 under the lower-estimated-past assumption for 
Method 2 are shown in Table 5. Several patterns are reminiscent of Table 3. The 
coefficient in column (1) again indicates that being an M-PESA user is associated with a 
more positive boost in ∆SavingsScore. When considering the 2009 and 2013 years 
separately, the effect is again more pronounced for 2013 than for 2009, and is actually 
not statistically significant at all in 2009. When testing the null hypothesis that 𝛽!in 2009 
is equal to 𝛽!in 2013, we are able to reject this possibility at a 5% significance level. This 
indicates a fundamental shift in the way M-PESA relates to savings behavior between the 
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two years. This shift is of an optimistic nature, whereby M-PESA promotes formality to a 
greater extent in 2013 than in 2009. 
Table 5. Method 2 OLS Results Under the Lower-Estimated-Past Assumption 
    
Dependent Variable=∆SavingsScore 
 
Overall 
(1) 
2009  
(2) 
2013  
(3) 
AMPESAUser 0.0727** 0.00714 0.117*** 
 
(3.24) (0.23) (3.48) 
    Year -0.320*** 
  
 
(-18.71) 
  Gender 0.0657* 0.0763 0.0552 
 
(2.49) (1.80) (1.55) 
Age -0.00470*** -0.00691*** -0.00239 
 
(-4.48) (-4.60) (-1.54) 
Hhold head age 0.00117 0.00124 0.000566 
 
(1.10) (0.75) (0.39) 
Hhold head gender -0.0418 -0.0417 -0.0428 
 
(-1.52) (-0.89) (-1.20) 
Education 0.0474*** 0.0287*** 0.0666*** 
 
(7.70) (3.39) (7.40) 
Cluster -0.0175 -0.0232 -0.00800 
 
(-0.93) (-0.84) (-0.31) 
Marital -0.00255 -0.000596 -0.00186 
 
(-0.31) (-0.05) (-0.16) 
Expense 0.00000141*** 0.00000116* 0.00000216*** 
 
(3.79) (2.57) (3.32) 
Is hhold head 0.0612* 0.0741 0.0552 
 
(2.27) (1.58) (1.63) 
OwnMobile 0.0834*** 0.0799** 0.0955** 
 
(3.77) (2.82) (2.72) 
    Constant 0.494*** 0.639*** 0.0169 
 
(7.24) (6.24) (0.18) 
N 10666 5415 5251 
R-squared 0.0615 0.0322 0.0504 
t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 5 % level, ** Significant at the 1 % level, 
*** Significant at the 0.1 % level. 
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 The same regressions are then run again under the higher-estimated-past 
assumption, with findings expressed in Table 6. As was true in Table 4, the coefficient on 
the M-PESA user variable in columns 1-3 fail to show significance. However, 85.39% of 
the sample (10,623 respondents) have a ∆SavingsScore of 0 by this measure. The higher-
estimated-past assumption is constructed to overestimate the number of people who 
exhibit no change. Next, if the sample is restricted to only the individuals who report 
some sort of dropping behavior, columns 4-6 corroborate previous findings. Looking at 
this subpopulation, there is again a statistically significant positive effect of being an M-
PESA user. This effect is stronger in 2013 in 2009, however a test of the statistical 
difference between the two coefficients does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis 
that these coefficients are the same. Although columns 4-6 prove to be an interesting 
exercise, its findings cannot be generalized, since they were performed on a group with 
particular savings characteristics. 
Table 6. Method 2 OLS Regressions under the Higher-Estimated-Past Assumption 
Dependent Variable=∆SavingsScore 
 
Overall 
(1) 
2009  
(2) 
2013 
(3) 
Overall, 
 if dropped 
in past  
(4) 
2009,  
if dropped in 
past  
(5) 
2013,  
if dropped 
in past  
(6) 
MPESAUser 0.0134 0.0120 0.0140 0.115*** 0.0796* 0.142*** 
 
(1.38) (1.08) (0.85) (4.39) (2.46) (3.48) 
       Year -0.0673*** 
  
-0.146*** 
  
 
(-9.08) 
  
(-7.25) 
  
       Other Controls varies varies varies varies varies varies 
Constant -0.0561 -0.0289 -0.144** -0.579*** -0.471*** -0.787*** 
 
(-1.90) (-0.78) (-3.19) (-6.88) (-3.88) (-6.85) 
N 10666 5415 5251 3543 1574 1969 
R-squared 0.0171 0.0214 0.0068 0.0617 0.0707 0.0534 
t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 5 % level, ** Significant at the 1 % level, *** 
Significant at the 0.1 % level. 
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Discussion of Section 5B 
 Taken together, Tables 3-6 provide consistent evidence of a positive relationship 
between M-PESA and changes in savings formality. A cautious interpretation of Tables 4 
and 6 would say that these do not contribute evidence but would still grant that they do 
not contradict the story from Tables 3 and 5.  Considering the wide range of possibilities 
spanned by the different assumptions behind these four Tables, this consistency is 
notable.  
M-PESA is often touted as “banking the unbanked,” but this claim has not 
previously been subject to much statistical analysis. This paper provides evidence that M-
PESA does indeed promote savings formality. This is likely a combination of reducing 
barriers to access and increasing incentives to use savings products. On one hand, M-
PESA connects people to products they otherwise would not have been able to access, by 
decreasing geographic constraints and transaction costs. At the same time, M-PESA may 
also cause dispositional changes, whereby a person who has previously had little 
experience with financial products now thinks more deliberately about his finances. 
 In addition, a consistent story emerges regarding how the M-PESA landscape has 
changed from 2009 to 2013.   The finding that M-PESA promotes savings formality to a 
greater extent in 2013 suggests that Safaricom’s efforts to increase product offerings and 
quality of service have made M-PESA into an increasingly useful innovation. Since one 
of the most-celebrated aspects of M-PESA is its ability to integrate people into the formal 
financial sector, thereby increasing their livelihoods and possibly even contributing to 
economic growth, it is imperative for research on M-PESA take into account how the 
system changes over time, using the most recent data possible. The analyses here cannot 
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distinguish between M-PESA-related changes and user-related changes, and it is possible 
that the latter also contributes to boosts in savings formality. Perhaps people who have 
had M-PESA for longer are more likely to move towards formal savings, after gradually 
gaining comfort with M-PESA.  
The question of how a changing user base might be impacting savings formality is 
a complex one. Both theory and evidence suggest that those who adopt technologies later 
are less privileged.  One question in the 2013 survey identifies users who have adopted 
M-PESA in the past 12 months. This group is less well-off than their counterparts in the 
survey who adopted M-PESA earlier on, and Figure 4 shows a small sample of the many 
characteristics that follow this pattern. For example, the late adopters are less wealthy, 
less financially included, less educated, and less likely to be household heads. Similarly, 
the average 2013 M-PESA user is less wealthy, less financially included, and less 
educated than the average 2009 user.  
Figure 4. Characteristics of M-PESA users 
 2013 Users 
who Adopted 
in Past 12 
Months 
(N=141) 
2013 Users 
who 
Adopted 
Earlier 
(N=3328) 
2013 Users 
Overall 
(N=3469) 
2009 
Users 
Overall 
(N=1824) 
Mean Monthly Expenditures 8493.475 12028.26 11884.59 15011.03 
Savings formality level (coded on a 0-
4 scale, where 1 is rudimentary 
products, 2 is informal, 3 is semi-
formal, and 4 is formal), based on 
someone’s most formal product 
1.55 2.16 2.13 2.86 
Percentage of people who are banked 19.86% 36.03% 35.37% 55.98% 
Education level (1-7 scale) 3.482 3.71 3.70 4.34 
Percentage who are heads of 
households  
39.01% 53.61% 53.0% 51.86% 
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 The congruency of the above statistics suggests that the 2013 users are also less 
privileged in a number of ways that are not captured in this survey. The finding that M-
PESA boosts savings formality in 2013 more than it does in 2009 is especially 
meaningful in light of the fact that 2013 users are less privileged. In one sense, it is 
surprising since the less well-off generally have a lowered capacity and willingness to 
access new opportunities and thus increase formalization. This suggests that M-PESA’s 
effectiveness in 2013 is even more impressive than might be captured in this analysis. On 
the other hand, it might be the case that it was easier for the less-privileged to increase 
their formalization because they had a greater need to do so. Finally, there is the user-
based explanation that the increased formalization boost in 2013 is driven by the fact that 
people have had the product for longer, and perhaps the same person’s usage habits 
evolves over time towards a preference for formality. 
5C. Perverse Effects of Bank Accessibility  
 Although counterintuitive, increasing access to the formal financial sector has 
been shown to result in lowered usage of these services in particular cases.6 This is 
because people in developing countries feel particularly large pressures from family and 
friends to use their personal funds to support them. As M-PESA and banks became 
increasingly integrated, formal savings accounts have become more liquid. After all, it is 
now common for banks in Kenya to allow for money in someone’s bank account to be 
converted to and from M-PESA’s e-currency. The final empirical section of this paper 
looks at the degree to which individuals feel pressure from friends and families in light of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Baland et al (2011) show that people will incur costs to signal to avoid requests for help from family 
members. Jakiela and Ozier (2012) find that women in Western Kenya place value in hiding income from 
relatives. Platteau (2000) identifies social norms that dictate people help friend and families when they 
have available funds. 
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the fact that mobile banking makes it harder to refuse requests for help. This is expected 
to play out differently in 2009 as compared to 2013 in regards to formal savings, since 
M-PESA was not structurally equipped to directly withdraw from banks in 2009. The 
following regressions are used: 6                     𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠!"= 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟!" +   𝛽!𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"+ 𝛽!𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟!"  ×  𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝛽!𝑋!" + 𝜀!" 6                     𝐷𝑟𝑜𝑝𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠!"= 𝛼 + 𝛽!𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟!" +   𝛽!𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"+ 𝛽!𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑆𝐴𝑈𝑠𝑒𝑟!"  ×  𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝛽!𝑋!" + 𝜀!" 
The variables correspond to an individual i from year t. The dependent variables are 
binary, equaling 1 if that person has exhibited a drop in at least one product in that 
savings group. MPESAUser is again a dummy that equals 1 if someone is a registered 
user, and X represents the same set of controls as has been used throughout the paper. 
SupportExpensePortion is a continuous variable equaling the amount a person spends on 
supporting other family members each month, divided by a measure of total monthly 
expenditures. It is used here as a proxy for social pressure to support others. 𝛽! is the 
coefficient of greatest interest, since this interaction term describes the behavior of 
someone who has M-PESA and faces greater social pressure. 
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Table 7. OLS Results for the Impact of Social Pressure and M-PESA Use 
 
2009 Drop 
Informal Savings 
2013 Drop 
Informal Savings 
2009 Drop 
Formal Savings 
2013 Drop 
Formal Savings 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     MPESAUser 0.0500** 0.0751*** 0.0782*** 0.0169 
 
(2.75) (3.60) (5.54) (1.30) 
     SupportExpensePortion 0.00873 0.162* 0.0187 0.00637 
 
(0.21) (2.46) (0.59) (0.16) 
 -0.0878 
(-0.94) 
-0.0612 
(-0.71) 
-0.0757 
(-1.05) 
0.114* 
(2.12) 
 MPESAUser X  
SupportExpensePortion 
     Gender 0.0215 0.0177 -0.0396* -0.0254 
 
(0.94) (0.84) (-2.22) (-1.94) 
Age 0.00331*** 0.00222* 0.00355*** 0.00206*** 
 
(4.01) (2.43) (5.53) (3.61) 
Hhold head age -0.00146 -0.000923 0.000380 -0.000333 
 
(-1.62) (-1.08) (0.54) (-0.62) 
Hhold head gender 0.0123 0.0265 -0.00344 0.00209 
 
(0.48) (1.27) (-0.17) (0.16) 
Education 0.0204*** 0.00849 0.0212*** 0.0140*** 
 
(4.54) (1.61) (6.07) (4.25) 
Cluster 0.0307* 0.0177 0.0128 0.0260** 
 
(2.09) (1.17) (1.12) (2.76) 
Marital 0.0146* 0.000348 0.00814 0.0112** 
 
(2.19) (0.05) (1.58) (2.64) 
Expense -0.000000454 0.000000371 0.000000344 0.000000738** 
 
(-1.92) (1.00) (1.87) (3.19) 
Is hhold head 0.0105 -0.0108 0.0159 0.0172 
 
(0.41) (-0.54) (0.81) (1.37) 
OwnsMobile 0.00721 -0.0139 0.0422*** 0.0223 
 
(0.48) (-0.68) (3.62) (1.74) 
     Constant -0.0715 0.136* -0.137** -0.0948** 
 
(-1.30) (2.42) (-3.20) (-2.71) 
     N 5188 4886 5188 4886 
R-squared 0.0206 0.0116 0.0817 0.0400 
t statistics in parentheses. * Significant at the 5 % level, ** Significant at the 1 % level, *** Significant 
at the 0.1 % level. 
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 The coefficient on the interaction term is only significant for the dependent 
variable of dropping formal savings in the 2013 dataset. This implies that being an M-
PESA user and facing greater social pressure results in an increased likelihood of 
dropping a formal savings device, above the effect of simply having M-PESA or simply 
facing greater social pressure.  This coefficient increases substantially, from -0.0757 in 
2009, to 0.114 to 2013, reflecting the fact that M-PESA has much greater structural 
connectivity with banks in 2013 than in 2009. The fact that this interaction term is not 
significant in either year for the dependent variable of dropping informal savings might 
reflect the fact that M-PESA does not alter the accessibility of informal savings funds in 
any clear direction. For example, M-PESA might make someone with strong family 
pressures less likely to use a secret hiding place as a savings device because family 
members can access it. In this case M-PESA makes people more likely to drop this kind 
of informal savings. Or, maybe M-PESA lets someone join a Merry-go-round savings 
group they didn’t have access to before. It might be harder for family members to tap into 
someone’s funds when they are committed in this way, so an M-PESA user who faces 
social pressure might in this case be more likely to pick up this kind of informal savings.  
 As an additional test of the theory that M-PESA may induce movements away 
from formal savings for people who face particularly high social pressures, I apply the 
previously developed savings score indices. This serves as robustness check to show that 
the previous result is unlikely to be a spurious finding. This asks whether other measures 
of formality also tell a story that is consistent with the idea that M-PESA moves certain 
people away from formality to a greater degree in 2013 than in 2009. The equation has 
the same right hand side equations (6) and (7), but the dependent variable is 
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∆SavingsScore, as defined in all of the four methods outlined in section B. The results for 
the coefficients of interest are displayed in Table 8. The coefficient on the interaction 
term is positively significant in 2009 using all four methods, meaning that someone who 
is an M-PESA user and faces high social pressure still sees a movement towards 
formality. However, this is no longer the case in 2013, where the coefficients are much 
smaller and oftentimes even negative. Although this negative relationship is not 
statistically significant, it is notable that all four methods affirm the idea that there is a 
shift between the two years. This can be taken as evidence that M-PESA users who faced 
high social pressures previously were still more likely to move towards formality in 2009. 
Perhaps, for example, because M-PESA was a more secure savings device than a secret 
hiding place. This was no longer the case in 2013, when M-PESA also exerts  
downward pressures on formality due to the decreased attractiveness of savings accounts.   
Table 8. Social Pressure and M-PESA Use, As Measured Using Savings Scores 
 
2009, 
Method
1a 
2013, 
Method
1a 
2009, 
Method
1b 
2013, 
Method
1b 
2009, 
Method
2a 
2013, 
Method
2b 
2009, 
Method
2b 
2013, 
Method
2b 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         MPESAUser 0.0485 0.189** -0.0168 0.00343 -0.0241 0.126** 0.00244 0.0198 
 (1.25) (4.58) (-1.07) (0.17) (-0.69) (3.34) (0.19) (1.08) 
Support 
Expense 
Portion 
-0.0574 
(-0.66) 
-0.150 
(-1.15) 
-0.0465 
(-1.32) 
-0.0717 
(-1.14) 
-0.0569 
(-0.73) 
-0.167 
(-1.41) 
-0.0394 
(-1.40) 
-
0.0890+ 
(-1.54) 
 
AMPESAUserX 
SupportExpense 
Portion 
0.389++ 
(1.95) 
-0.215 
(-1.27) 
0.134++ 
(1.67) 
 
-0.0481 
(-0.58) 
0.328++ 
(1.83) 
-0.145 
(-0.93) 
0.101+ 
(1.58) 
0.00105 
(0.01) 
The “a” (as in in “method 1a”) refers to the lower-estimated-past assumption, and “b” refers to the higher-
estimated past assumption. T statistics are in parenthesis.  + is significant at a 15% level, ++ is significant at 
a 10% level, * is significant at a 5% level, and ** is significant at a 1% level 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 Despite the attention and celebration that M-PESA has already received for 
increasing financial inclusion, this paper suggests that the best may be yet to come. This 
paper shows, using the most recent dataset on this topic to my knowledge, that M-PESA 
in 2013 differed in meaningful ways from the system that existed in 2009. There exists 
substantial differences between how M-PESA substitutes with other savings products, 
how it encourages individuals to alter the suite of savings products that they use, and how 
it causes people to respond to social pressures.  
 Future research on M-PESA must remember the ways in which this system is 
rapidly changing, keeping in mind that innovations in the M-PESA service may very well 
translate to large-scale shifts in the nature of the system. Data of an experimental and 
panel nature should investigate some of the potential reasons behind the shift that seems 
to have occurred between 2009 and 2013. It would be tremendous useful to disentangle 
the effects of changing user characteristics from the effects of a change in the actual M-
PESA system.  
 This paper focuses a great deal on substitutive effects, and future research should 
investigate more directly the complementary relationship that M-PESA holds with other 
financial products.  Doing so would shed light on the question of whether, on net, M-
PESA has a more complementary or substitutive effect on various products. Although 
this paper does not investigate the impact of M-PESA on the credit and loans behavior of 
individuals, this is an area of potentially large movement. As M-PESA connects people to 
an increasingly diverse and sophisticated set of financial instruments, the need for 
research to keep pace with the system’s innovation will be even more critical.  
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